
# We Power Life

## Nuclear's Role in ISONE's Energy Mix


Capacity (and Energy) Market Design in New England Roundtable Feb. 28, 2014



#### The Market Context: Illustrative Conditions Affecting Vermont Yankee and Other Nuclear Generators (2005 – 2013)




#### **Combined Cycle Plant Economics in New England**



\* Calculated using Brattle's Aug 7th report, adjusted for additional Capex needs and ISONE operating challenges


#### Addressing Energy Pricing Issues Is As Important As Fixing the Capacity Market

The capacity market is designed to provide the missing money; If the energy market isn't performing sufficiently, it means that everyone has to lean more heavily on the capacity market.



New England Generating Plants' Revenue Source\* by Technology

#### Retaining Existing Low-Carbon Generation May be More Economic Than Introducing New Capacity in the Near Term



\* Average of Advanced and Conventional CC; Source EIA

\*\* Existing nuclear cost range is an estimate based on internal analysis

1 PTC and ITC are considered as subsidies, which lower the average cost of new generation


#### **Declining Generation Diversity**

1990 – 2020, %

Existing nuclear plants provide a key fueldiversity benefit with significant climaterelated advantages, which should not be taken for granted in policy and market rules 100% 75% 50% 25% 0% 2000 2010 2020\* 1990 illustrative **Nuclear** Coal NG **Renewables Oil** Other


**ISONE Power Generation Fuel Mix\*** 

#### Loss of Generation at Existing Nuclear Plants Will Make it Harder to Meet CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions-Reduction Commitments



Assume that:

 ▲ 16 M St CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions (+50% ↑)
▲ 0.7 bcf/d Gas Demand (+30% ↑)




Keeping emissions below the cap without nuclear will mean higher CO<sub>2</sub> allowance prices

\* This assumes natural gas combined cycle plants; Based on CO2 emissions from the states that are part of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 6

### Aggressive Renewable Energy Growth Policies Can Create System Reliability Problems, Which Can Be Costly to Fix

**California Duck Curve** 



Source: California ISO

#### A Case Study: Germany's Renewable Subsidies

2000 Renewable Energy Act created strong incentives for renewables


Subsidies accelerated renewable growth

Post Fukushima, Germany decided to shut down all nuclear plants by 2022, and shift to all renewables by 2050


Government subsidies in 2012: \$22.7 billion

Increasing electric rates threatening Germany's competitiveness

Sources: International Energy Agency, EnergyAgency.NRW



Electric Rates in Germany; cents/kWh



#### Conclusions

- ISONE's current market design is not sustainable in the long run; both Capacity and Energy market designs need to be reassessed so that they are producing prices at competitive levels. This is urgent.
- Out-of-market contracts and subsidies for new resources further distort competitive markets
- Nuclear generators currently provide many desirable attributes including high capacity factors, fuel diversity, and avoidance of greenhouse gases, on a scale much larger than competing technologies. But these nuclear plants are being forced to compete on an uneven playing field and may end up leaving the market.
- We're working with ISONE, and other stakeholders on several options that dovetail with the State's clean energy goals to solve this issue, because we think it's an expensive failure in today's markets and we think that the solutions – while outside the box – may be very sensible and cost-effective compared to some of the alternatives currently under discussion.